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1. Introduction  
 
The economic growth and transformation of the Korean economy from 1962 to the 
present has been truly remarkable (see, for example, Harvie and Lee, 2003a and 
2003b). From being a poverty stricken and economically backward country in 1962 
with a GDP per capita of only US$82, by 2005 this exceeded US$16,000 and the 
country had become the fourth largest economy in Asia (after China, Japan and India 
on a PPP basis) and the twelfth largest in the world (again on a PPP basis) (see 
Wikipedia, 2005). Export driven growth provided the basis for this rapid and 
sustained period of economic growth, such that by 2005 Korea had become the 
world’s eleventh largest exporting nation (Central Intelligence Agency, 2006) and 
thirteenth largest importing nation (Central Intelligence Agency, 2005). The country 
had, therefore, achieved an impressive record of growth and integration into the high 
tech global economy. 
 
The economy has, however, experienced periods of economic turbulence: the heavy 
and chemical industries drive of the early 1970s, the economic and political turmoil 
arising from the assassination of President Park in 1979, the export driven rapid 
expansion of the economy in the late 1980s, the growth slowdown in 1992-93 from 
stabilization policy aimed at reducing inflationary pressure, the collapse of the 
exchange rate in late 1997 that exposed long standing weaknesses in the country’s 
development model, the subsequent severe economic slowdown in 1998, the ‘tech 
wreck’ of 2001 arising from slowing world demand for IT related products upon 
which the economy is heavily dependent for export growth, the credit card bubble of 
2002 and 2003 and the subsequent weakening of domestic demand. 
 
In this context the primary aim of the paper is twofold. First, to conduct a robust 
empirical analysis of the timing of major structural breaks for the Korean economy, 
employing macroeconomic data covering the period 1980Q1 to 2005Q1, utilizing the 
Innovational Outlier (IO) and Additive Outlier (AO) models developed by Perron 
(1997). This empirical analysis also involves a comparison of results for non 
stationarity of the data using the conventional Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit 
root test, with that obtained from the IO and AO models. It is essential to correctly 
identify structural breaks in data for any economy: to avoid model misspecification 
and coefficient bias using such data, and to ensure that tests for data non-stationarity 
are robust. Second, to provide an interpretation of the major factors that have 
contributed to these structural breaks, specifically in terms of key policy changes and 
other domestic and external sources of economic turbulence.    
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly overviews Korean 
macroeconomic developments from the early 1960s to 2005. Section 3 briefly discusses 
conventional unit root tests that do not take into consideration the potential existence 
of structural breaks, and presents empirical results based on the Augmented Dickey–
Fuller (ADF) test. Section 4 conducts a brief review of testing procedures which do 
take into account the presence of potential structural breaks in the data, discusses the 
Perron (1997) Innovational Outlier (IO) and Additive Outlier (AO) models, and 
presents empirical findings based on these methodologies. This section also provides 
the context to explain the reasons behind, and the importance of, the identified 
structural breaks. Finally, section 5 presents some concluding remarks.  
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2. An overview of the Korean macro-economy 
  
This section provides the context for our empirical analysis, and the importance of 
robust identification of potential structural breaks in macroeconomic data for an 
economy prone to periods of economic turbulence. For identification and analysis of 
periods of economic turbulence in the case of Korea, and hence for the existence of 
potential structural breaks,  it is useful to break its period of prolonged growth into a 
number of phases: the establishment of a growth and development strategy (1962-71), 
the heavy and chemical industries drive (1972-79), economic stabilization and 
liberalization (1980-89), economic opening up, global integration and financial crisis 
(1990-97), post crisis reform and restructuring (1998 to the present). Each of these 
periods is now briefly discussed in turn 
 
Growth and development strategy 1962-71 
 
This period saw the introduction of sweeping economic reforms emphasizing 
exporting, focusing on labour intensive light manufacturing industries (see Harvie and 
Lee, 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 1996; Ranis, 1971; Smith, 2000; Song, 1990). Export targets 
were agreed between government and individual firms, with emphasis placed on the 
development of firms best able to expand export capacity and acquire and utilize 
technology. Government owned banks facilitated this process through their 
preferential allocation of credit to such firms. Consequently, from the early days of 
economic development, a relationship based system developed among firms, their 
banks and the government (Smith, 2000). 
 
This development strategy proved to be highly successful. The average annual growth 
rate was 8.8 per cent during 1962-1971, double that prior to 1962. Per capita income 
increased from US$82 in 1961 to US$286 in 1971. The industrial structure of the 
country changed dramatically, with the share of manufacturing increasing from 12 per 
cent to 20 per cent of GDP over the same period. Exports increased rapidly from 
US$41 million in 1961 to US$1,133 million in 1971 (a 28 fold increase), representing 
an average annual growth rate of 39 per cent. The strategy increased domestic savings 
and employment, and enabled the economy to benefit from economies of scale in 
production and technology transfer. 
 
The heavy and chemical industries (HCI) drive (1972-79)  
 
Despite the previous impressive outcomes the development strategy changed from the 
early 1970s, arising from a number of adverse side effects from the export driven 
growth (see Harvie and Lee, 2003a, 2003b). First, it contributed to a sectoral 
imbalance between the light and heavy industry sectors. Second, the export orientated 
industrialization program widened the gap between those engaged in export business 
and those in domestic business. Finally, by the early 1970s light industry exports 
began to weaken, highlighting the need to develop new exportable products. 
Consequently, in May 1973, Korea shifted from general export promotion and 
incentives to the targeting of strategic HCIs (steel, heavy machinery, automobiles, 
industrial electronics, shipbuilding, non ferrous metals and petrochemicals). Industry 
neutral incentives for exports were replaced by industry specific and, in some cases, 
firm specific measures involving generous government assistance (Smith, 2000). The 
main tool of promotion was, again, preferential access to credit from government 
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owned banks, funded predominantly by external bank borrowing that resulted in a 
rapid rise in foreign debt. Other HCI incentives included subsidies, tax reductions and 
exemptions (Rhee, 1994). Without such government incentives large companies 
would not have been willing to bear the risk and cost of such extensive investment in 
these industries. 
 
The HCI promotion strategy resulted in a number of economic problems: rapid 
monetary expansion and increased budget deficits, investments were made without 
sufficient analysis of their viability and impact on the overall economy, and there 
were many overlapping investments, the focus on strategic industries resulted in 
enormous economic inefficiency, the socialization of bankruptcy risk, combined with 
the low interest rate ceilings, contributed to moral hazard in the banking and corporate 
sectors, that encouraged, for firms in targeted sectors, excessively high levels of debt 
and an emphasis on market share rather than profitability and shareholder value (Huh 
and Kim, 1994). The HCI drive gave a major boost to the growth of the chaebol, 
which radically transformed the industrial structure and market concentration (OECD, 
1994, p.60).  
 
The economy showed signs of overheating during 1976-78, accompanied by a rapid 
increase in wages that surpassed the growth of labour productivity. This was 
exacerbated further by the Middle East construction boom in 1976 and its impact on 
domestic land prices. These caused one of the country’s worst bouts of inflation that 
resulted in weakened export competitiveness, and slowed export and overall economic 
growth.  
 
Economic stabilization and liberalization (1980-89) 
 
Against a backdrop of: the second oil price crisis; a bad agricultural harvest; and a 
domestic political crisis with the assassination of President Park in October 1979, the 
first negative rate of GDP growth since the emergence of Park’s regime (1961-79) 
emerged in 1980, and consumer price inflation soared to 28.7 per cent. HCI 
investment and a global and domestic economic downturn combined to leave many of 
the heavily targeted industries of the 1970s with severe over-capacity problems in the 
early 1980s. Against this background a major shift by the new government focused 
policy upon economic stabilization, trade liberalization, financial liberalization, 
market opening, promotion of small and medium enterprises, antitrust legislation, 
greater opening to foreign investment, preferences for specific industries to be 
reduced, and structural change toward the development of more technology based 
industries (Smith, 2000).  
  
By the mid 1980s the economic stabilization measures had achieved their desired 
objectives, as inflation decreased and the economy recovered its competitiveness, 
productivity and growth. From 1986 to 1989 economic conditions were given a 
further boost by favourable external conditions from the three lows – low oil price, 
weak US dollar, and low global interest rates. In 1986, for the first time in Korea’s 
modern history, the nation’s current account shifted into the black, where it remained 
until 1990, the balance of payments was in sizeable surplus, exports exceeded imports 
and domestic savings exceeded domestic investment for the first time since the First 
Five Year Plan (Harvie and Lee, 2003b). The economy registered a high annual 
growth rate of 12 per cent. Industrial restructuring also made headway with the share 
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of the manufacturing sector in total GNP rising from 29.7 per cent in 1980 to 32.3 per 
cent by 1987. By late 1988, however, a presidential election, the Olympic games, 
abnormally high wages and incomes growth, steeply rising land prices, and ongoing 
structural problems in the economy combined to severely jolt economic stability and 
economic growth slowed to 8 per cent in 1989 (Lee, 1996). 
 
Economic opening and the onset of financial crisis (1990-97) 
 
The period of the 1990s witnessed Korea’s increased integration into the global 
economy through further external trade and financial liberalization that represented a 
natural extension to the liberalization measures adopted during the 1980s. However, 
the seeds of the financial crisis that were to hit in late 1997, already planted during the 
periods previously discussed, were further exacerbated by developments and 
measures implemented during 1990-97.  
 
Economic growth remained strong during this period with the exception of an 
economic slow down in 1992-93 arising from a significant slowdown in investment 
expenditure, as well as decline in consumption expenditure, as part of a stabilization 
policy to reduce inflationary pressure during 1990-91. However, the benign 
macroeconomic environment of the 1990s, characterized by: high GDP and export 
growth until 1996; low inflation; fiscal surpluses in general; high savings and 
investment; low unemployment; and, until 1996, modest trade and current account 
imbalances, hid growing financial weaknesses in the heavily indebted and weakly 
profitable corporate sector, reflecting the tendency of business conglomerates to 
diversify into capital-intensive industries, and financial sector and an unprecedented 
accumulation of short term debt (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
(1999); Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998; Economist (The), 1998; Kwon, 1998; 
Lee, 1999a and 1999b; Min, 1998; Park, 1998; and Radelet and Sachs, 1998a and 
1998b). The latter increasingly exposed the country to financial turbulence in global 
and regional markets. This process was driven by the financial liberalization of the 
early 1990s as an already fragile domestic financial system, a legacy from earlier 
periods, was encumbered by moral hazard, poor supervision and regulation, heavy 
government intervention, poor accounting standards and lack of transparency and 
underdeveloped capital markets, contributed to a significant increase in short term 
capital flows (mainly in the form of debt and relative to foreign exchange reserves)1.  
 
Such fragilities were of little concern, however, in an environment of rapid growth of 
exports and output. With the deterioration of the country’s terms of trade and resulting 
growth slowdown in export values in 1996 and 1997, however, the highly over-
leveraged corporate sector came under intense profitability and cash flow pressures. 
In 1997 a number of chaebol became insolvent or had to seek protection from 
creditors. An already shaky financial sector, arising from imprudent and excessive 
lending to the chaebol, experienced a further sharp deterioration in non-performing 
loans. Government action to tackle this problem head on was lacking. By October 
1997 further pressure began to be strongly applied by international investors on the 
currency as concerns over the third major fragility, excessive short term foreign debt, 
came in to play. The ability of the country to meet its short-term interest and debt 
                                                 
1 Korea’s short term foreign debt was high relative to its international reserves, a consequence of its 
decision to liberalize short term borrowing rather than direct investment inflows (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). 
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repayments was questioned as useable foreign exchange reserves diminished 
alarmingly. The consequence was the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98. 
 
Reform and restructuring 1998-present 
Korea made remarkable advances after the 1997 financial crisis, achieving an average 
annual growth rate of 6 per cent over the period 2000-04, enabling it to be one of 
Asia’s few expanding economies. Despite this, turbulence within the economy from 
domestic and external sources was still prevalent. In 2001 the slowing global 
economy and falling exports due to the ‘tech wreck’ (reduced global demand for IT 
products and falling semi-conductor prices) accounted for the drop in the growth rate 
to 3.3 per cent. The credit card bubble of 2001 and 2002 contributed to strong 
domestic demand, but this was reversed in late 2002 as households reduced 
consumption following a period of rapid accumulation of debt and once again, in 
2003, the economy entered a recession. Despite weak domestic demand the 
acceleration of real export growth, to a historical high of 20 per cent, supported output 
growth of 4.6 per cent in 2004. Exports slowed significantly in the first half of 2005, 
due in part to weaker demand from Chin which had become an increasingly important 
trading partner.  
Key contributory factors to the country’s economic performance from 1998-present 
have been: reform progress in areas of weakness exposed by the financial crisis, 
market opening to international competition, strength in key sectors of the economy, 
particularly in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, and 
strong external demand particularly from China which has emerged as its biggest 
trading partner. The country’s economic performance is also underpinned by 
significant inputs of labour and capital, reflecting still-rapid population growth, rising 
labour force participation rates and a high level of investment. Nearly half of the 
major business groups (the chaebol) have disappeared, while foreign ownership of 
listed companies has increased from 15 per cent to 42 per cent. Rising foreign direct 
investment includes an important foreign presence in the banking sector.  
According to the OECD (2005) there are a number of outstanding issues essential to 
the maintenance of the economy’s performance: maintaining macroeconomic stability 
and sound public finances, the need to upgrade the innovation system to promote 
faster productivity gains by improving the R&D framework, improving labour 
productivity which stands at around one-half of the OECD average, strengthening 
product market competition, restructuring tertiary education to enhance human 
capital, enhancing labour market flexibility, further improving corporate governance, 
increasing efficiency in the corporate sector, ensuring better supervision of the 
financial sector and reducing the legacy of extensive government intervention in the 
economy, upgrading competition policy and continuing the process of opening up to 
international trade and foreign direct investment.  
In the context of this brief overview of the Korean economy the remainder of this 
paper is devoted to: analyzing macroeconomic data for the Korean economy with the 
objective of conducting a robust empirical analysis of the existence and timing of 
major structural breaks in the economy, and linking such breaks, where relevant, with 
key economic developments as identified in this section of the paper. 
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3. Unit Root Tests without Structural Breaks 
It is essential to test for the existence of a unit root when using time-series data for 
model estimation. Failure to do so means that the standard asymptotic distribution 
theory does not apply, resulting in model misspecification, coefficient bias and 
spurious estimation inferences (Campbell and Perron, 1991; Afandi, 2005). 
 
The standard procedure for detecting non-stationary behaviour in data is to use the 





t t i t i t
i
y t y c yμ β α ε− −
=
Δ = + + + Δ +∑                   (1) 
where yt is the time series being tested, t is a time trend variable, ∆ denotes the first 
difference operator, and k is the number of lags which are added to the model to 
ensure that residuals, εt, are white noise. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SBC) are then used to determine the optimal lag 
length in the ADF equation. The ADF test is principally concerned with the 
estimation of α  in the above equation, that is we test the hypothesis 0H : α =0. The 
rejection of the null hypothesis implies that yt is stationary and integrated of order 
zero, or I(0). In other words the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if the value of 
the t-statistic for α (in absolute value) is greater than the critical value reported by 
MacKinnon (1991). Our empirical results applying the ADF test to Korean 
macroeconomic date for the period 1980(Q1)-2005(Q1) are reported in Table 1. This 
shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for any of the series 
under investigation. 
 
Based on our discussion in the previous section, however, the Korean economy has 
been subject to considerable economic turbulence over the period 1980-2005, 
suggestive that macroeconomic variables are likely to have been subject to a number 
of structural breaks, such as that from the stabilization programs in the early 1990s, 
the terms of trade shock of the mid 1990s, the financial and economic crisis of 1997-
98, the tech wreck of 2001, the aftermath of the credit card bubble of 2001-02. Hence 
the results of the ADF test on macroeconomic data could be biased towards not 
rejecting the unit root hypothesis, since it does not allow for the existence of such 
structural breaks. Therefore, it is of interest to analyze how these results can be 
affected by allowing for the existence of potential structural breaks in the data. For 
this purpose we use both the Perron (1997) Innovational and Additive outlier (IO, and 
AO) models to make more robust conclusions about the time series properties of the 
data series under investigation.  
 
4. Unit Root Tests in the Presence of Potential Structural Breaks 
 
As is well known, the issue of structural change, and its consequential implications for 
structural breaks, in macroeconomic time series data must be robustly addressed in 
order to ensure non spurious results of unit root tests of such data.  There can, of 
course, be many reasons for structural change, and these can include such diverse 
circumstances as economic crises, policy changes or regime shifts. For this reason it is  
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Table 1. Data description and ADF test results for Korean economy 
macroeconomic data, 1980Q1-2005Q1 
 
Description of 




lag length Inference 
GDP at 1995 





income at current 
price 
 














Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation at current 
price 








Total Imports($US)   Ln (IM)     1980Q1-2005Q1 -0.623 2            Unit Root 
Consumer Price 
index    Ln (CPI)      1980Q1-2005Q1 -2.193 0            Unit Root 
Money Supply at 
current price    Ln (Ms)       1980Q1-2005Q1 -1.624 1            Unit Root 
Exchange Rate 
(National currency 
per  $US) 
  Ln (ER)        1980Q1-2005Q1 -2.012 0            Unit Root 
 
Note: (1) The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent significance level for all 
variables under investigation. (2) The optimal lag length (k) is determined by the Schwartz Information 
Criterion (SBC). The data used was obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).   
 
Source: Derived by the authors. 
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extremely important to test the null hypothesis of structural stability against the 
alternative of a one-time structural break. If potential structural changes are not 
allowed for in the specification of an econometric model but are, in fact, present, the 
results may be spurious because they can be biased towards the erroneous non-
rejection of the non-stationarity hypothesis (Perron 1989; Perron 1997; Leybourne 
and Newbold; 2003; Pahlavani, Valadkhani and Worthington, 2005). 
 
Vogelsang and Perron (1998) describe the long-running debate which was sparked by 
Nelson and Plosser (1982) when they concluded that most macroeconomic time series 
contain a unit root, and thus implied that shocks to these series are permanent. Perron 
(1989) challenged this, showing that a rejection of the unit root hypothesis is possible 
for many macroeconomic time series if a one–time shift in the trend function is taken 
into account. He argued that many macroeconomic time series may be better 
described as having temporary shocks fluctuating around a broken deterministic trend 
function. Afandi (2005) noted that Perron (1989) introduced three models. The first 
model is a crash model where the conventional unit root test (ADF model) is 
augmented by incorporating a dummy break and a dummy post-break intercept that 
represents shifts in the intercept. The second model captured the effects of the 1973 
oil price shock by incorporating a dummy post-break slope representing a change in 
the trend due to the slow-down in economic growth following the shock. The third 
model combines these two effects (change in the slope and change in the intercept) in 
order to represent the effects on the world economy of the 1929 Stock Market Crash 
which precipitated the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
 
According to Vogelsang and Perron (1998), Perron’s (1989) key assumption is that 
the break date of the trend function is fixed (exogenous), and chosen independently of 
the data. In fact, previously, the time of any structural break was assumed to be 
known a priori in accordance with the underlying asymptotic distribution theory. As 
mentioned above the standard Dickey-Fuller procedure (ADF) was then extended by 
adding dummy variables representing different intercepts and slopes. However, 
Christiano (1992) and others have criticized this approach, arguing that considering 
the timing of the break as an exogenously known event invalidates the distribution 
theory underlying conventional testing (Pahlavani, Valadkhani and Worthington, 
2005). 
 
Consequently, the assumption of considering the timing of the breaks as a known 
event has drawn much criticism in subsequent papers. In response, a number of 
studies, including Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron (1994, 1997), Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997) and Bai and Perron (2003) to name just a few, have proposed different 
ways of estimating the time of the break endogenously. These studies have shown that 
this endogenous approach lessens the bias in the usual unit root tests. As Perron 
(1997, p.356) states:  “…if one can still reject the unit-root hypothesis under such a 
scenario it must be the case that it would be rejected under a less stringent 
assumption”.2   
 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed explanation concerning unit root tests in the presence of structural breaks, see 
Phillips and Xiao (1998) and Maddala and Kim (2003). 
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In the following section the unit root test on Korean macroeconomic data is conducted 
again, but in this case allowing for structural breaks by estimating the timing of the 
break endogenously. 
 
4.1. Innovational and Additive Outlier Models  
 
Perron (1994, 1997) advanced a class of test statistics which allows for two different 
forms of structural breaks: namely, the Additive Outlier (AO) model, which is more 
relevant for series exhibiting a sudden change in the mean (the crash model), and the 
Innovational Outlier (IO) model, which is designed to capture changes in a more 
gradual manner over time. In other words, Perron distinguishes breaks that occur 
suddenly from those which occur slowly over time by identifying two types of 
structural breaks and applying different models to each of them. 
 
According to Vogelsang and Perron (1998) and Pahlavani, Valadkhani and 
Worthington (2005), the IO model is appropriate where it is more logical to 
conceptualize the breaks as occurring gradually rather than suddenly. Following 
Perron (1994), the IO1 version of the model allows for gradual change in the intercept 
only, while the IO2 version of the model allows for gradual change in both the 






t t b t t i t i t
i
x DU t D T x c x eμ θ β δ α − −
=





t t t b t t i t i t
i
x DU t DT D T x c x eμ θ β γ δ α − −
=
= + + + + + + Δ +∑              (3)                  
where Tb denotes the time of the break, which is unknown and determined 
endogenously, tDU is the intercept dummy ( tDU =1 if t > Tb and zero otherwise), 
tDT  is the slope dummy ( tDT = Tt if t > Tb and zero elsewhere), and finally, ( )b tD T  is 
the crash dummy ( ( )b tD T =1 if t=Tb+1 and zero otherwise). The null hypothesis of a 
unit root is rejected if the absolute value of the t-statistic for testing α=1 is greater 
than the corresponding critical value. According to Colletaz and Serranto (1998), 
Perron (1997) applies three different methods in estimating the break date: 
- minimizing the value of the t statistic for testing α =1, 
- maximizing the absolute value of the t statistic on the break parameters 
associated with a change in either the intercept (| ˆtθ | ) or the slope ( | ˆtγ | ), and 
- minimizing the value of the t statistic on the break parameters associated with 
the change in either the intercept (| ˆtθ | ) or the slope | ˆtγ |. 
 
Vogelsang and Perron (1998) note that the truncation lag parameter, k, is determined 
using the data-dependent method proposed by Ng and Perron (1995). In this 
methodology, for any given value of Tb, k is determined according to the significance 
(at 5% or 10%) of the t-ratio on the coefficient associated with the last lag in the 
estimated auto-regression. The optimum k (or k*) is selected such that the coefficient 
on the last lag in an auto-regression of order k* is significant and that the last 
coefficient in an auto-regression of order greater than k* is insignificant, up to a 
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maximum order k= kmax (Perron, 1997; Lumsdaine and Papell, 1997; Pahlavani, 
Valadkhani and Worthington, 2005). 
 
In contrast to the gradual change in the IO model, the AO model assumes structural 
changes take place instantaneously. The additive outlier model demonstrates a change 
in the slope of the trend function only, but both segments of the trend function are 
joined at the time of the break. Moreover, as is clear from the above explanation, 
while the Innovational Outlier model (IO) involves a one-step testing procedure, the 
Additive Outlier (AO) testing procedure consists of a two-step procedure. In other 
words, testing for a unit root in the AO framework is done using a two-step procedure 
(Perron, 1994; Vogelsang and Perron, 1998, Afandi, 2005). First, the series is de-
trended by regressing it on the trend components (including constant, time-trend and 
dummy break:  
*t t ty t DT yμ β γ= + + +                                                                          (4)                               
where ty  is the de-trended series and DTt= 1(t>Tb)(t-Tb). Since equation (4) assumes 
that a structural break only impacts on the slope coefficient the second step uses the 
following regression, without trend function, to the residual of the first step in order to 





t t i t i t
i
y y c y eα − −
=
= + Δ +∑                                                                                    (5) 
Similar to the IO methodology, these equations are estimated sequentially for all 
possible values of Tb (Tb = k + 2,…,T-1) where T is the total number of observations 
so as to minimize the t-statistic for α =1. The lag length is data-determined using a 
general to specific approach, based on the significance of the t-statistic. In this 
methodology the break date is assumed to be unknown and determined endogenously. 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the t-statistic for α  is larger in absolute value than 
the corresponding critical value. An alternative, which is more widely used, is to 
select Tb as the value over all possible break dates that minimizes (or maximizes) the 
value of the t-statistic on γ=0 (Harris and Sollis, 2003; Pahlavani, Valadkhani and 
Worthington, 2005). 
 
4.2. Empirical results from the IO and AO Models 
 
In order to decide which particular IO model is most relevant the following model 
selection procedure is adopted. First, the least restrictive model (IO2) is estimated 
and, if γ̂t  is significant at the 5 per cent level or better, then the results are reported in 
Table 2. If γ̂t  is not statistically significant then the results from the IO1 model are 
presented.  In order to determine the sudden effect of an unknown structural break, the 
AO model is also estimated, and the results are presented in Table 3. 
 
In these models we apply the method of determining the appropriate lag length 
endogenously. A data-dependent method for selecting the value of lag length K is 
applied in this research. According to Ng and Perron (1995) (see also Ben-David and 
Papell, 1998), it is better to use the data-dependent method rather than making an a 
priori choice of a fixed K. They suggest starting with an upper bound of Kmax. We 
consider K as Kmax if the last lag included in the estimated equation is significant. If 
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the last lag considered is not significant then K is reduced by one. We continue this 
procedure until the last lag becomes significant. If no lags are significant then K is set 
to zero. Following Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) and Pahlavani, Valadkhani and 
Worthington, (2005), we consider the maximum (Kmax) equal to eight and, if the 
coefficient on the eighth lag is significant based on a t-test (i.e. at least 1.645 in 
absolute value), then we let K=Kmax. If not K is continually reduced until 
significance is achieved, otherwise K is set equal to zero. 
 
Using the sequential approach the regression equation is run with the values for Tb of 
(2…t-1), for each time series. The values of the t-statistic for variable α  are recorded 
and compared. From this comparison the break point is then selected by the value of 
Tb which minimizes the t-statistic on the coefficient α .  The unit root null hypothesis 
is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis if the t-statistic for α is significant 
and greater than the critical values tabulated by Perron (1997). Results from using the 
Innovational Outlier (IO) model are reported in Table 2: 
 
As shown in Table 1 the empirical results derived from the conventional ADF unit 
root test provide no evidence against the null hypothesis of a unit root for any of the 
series under investigation. Similarly, as shown in Table 3, the results from applying 
the AO, which takes into account the sudden effects of a potential break, again 
support the null hypothesis of a unit root for all of the series under investigation. The 
results based on the IO model in Table 2, however, show that by taking into account 
the existence of a gradual effect of a potential structural break, two of the variables 
under investigation (IM and ER) become stationary. The Zivot-Andrews (1992) 
method yielded identical results with the same two variables found to be stationary.3  
 
The timing of the structural changes based on the IO model (impacting on both the 
intercept and the slope (IO2) or intercept only (IO1) of each series) are represented by 
a solid line in Figure 1, and with a dotted line for the AO model. 
 
The timing of any structural break (Tb) for each series using both the IO and AO 
approaches are shown in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. From Table 2 the IO model 
shows that endogenously determined Tbs closely approximate, for seven of the ten 
variables, major structural breaks occurring in the financial crisis year of 1997 (ER in 
the second quarter), (GDP95, GNI, GFCF and IM in the third quarter), (Gc and CPI in 
the fourth quarter). For Ms the timing of the structural break is found to be the second 
quarter of 1991, for Pc the third quarter of 1993, while for X it was found to be the 
third quarter of 2000. 
 
Potential reasons for the timing of these structural breaks using the IO model for each 
of these variables is also provided in Table 2. In the cases of GDP95, GNI, GFCF, IM 
Gc and CPI, the impact of the Asian currency crisis and contagion from the third 
quarter and, more intensely, during the fourth quarter of 1997 is the most obvious 
explanation for their structural break at this time. For Ms the strong growth of GDP in 
1990 and 1991 arising from strong domestic demand, particularly in the construction 
sector, was met by the introduction of strong anti-inflationary stabilization measures 
                                                 
3 The results from applying the Zivot-Andrews testing procedure are not reported here, but are 
available on request from the authors. 
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Table 2. Innovational Outlier Model for Determining the Break Date in Intercept (IO1), or Both Intercept and Slope (IO2) 
 
Series Model Lag 
K ˆ
tγ \ ˆtθ     α̂           ˆtα      Inference Break Tb Possible causes 
Ln(GDP95) IO1 7 -3.50 0.563 -3.06 Unit root 1997:03 Asian financial crisis 
Ln (GNI) IO1 8 -2.47 0.906 -2.31 Unit root 1997:03 Asian financial crisis 
Ln (Pc) IO2 8 3.27 0.827 -2.98 Unit root 1993:03 The anti inflationary measures of 1990-91 resulted in a sharp decline in 
investment and consumption spending and slowdown in economic 
growth during 1992-93, and declining wage push. 
Ln (Gc) IO1 8 -2.66 0.597 -3.53 Unit root 1997:04 Asian financial crisis 
Ln (GFCF) IO1 8 -2.811 0.856 -3.13 Unit root 1997:03 Asian financial crisis 
Ln (X) IO2 8 -3.07 0.708 -3.61 Unit root 2000:03 Tech wreck, global economy slowdown, semi-conductor price crash. 
Ln (IM) IO1 7 -4.91 0.681 -4.91 Stationary 1997:03 Asian financial crisis 
Ln (CPI) IO2 8 2.46 0.883 -4.01 Unit root 1997:04 Asian financial crisis 
Ln(Ms) IO2 7 3.79 0.655 -4.73 Unit root 1991:02 Anti-inflationary stabilization measures arising from strong  demand 
(construction investment in particular) 
Ln (ER) IO2 3 4.32 0.560 -5.43 Stationary 1997:02 Asian financial crisis, chaebol bankruptcies, industrial unrest, poor 
trading performance, rising short term debt and inability to service this 
debt. 
Note: critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are equal to -5.57, -5.08 and -4.82, respectively for IO2, while for the IO1 model the critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels are equal to -5.41 , -4.80  and -4.58, respectively. The innovational outlier model (IO2) allows for breaks in both intercept and slope, while (IO1) allows for a break just 
in the intercept. These methodologies assume that changes occur gradually. Tb is selected as the value which minimizes the absolute value of the t-statistic on the parameter 
associated with the change in slope in the IO2 model or change in intercept in the IO1 model, (K Max= 8). 
 
Source: Derived by the authors. 
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Table 3. Additive Outlier Model (AO) for Determining the Timing of Breaks 
Series K γ̂  ˆtγ     α̂    ˆtα  Inference Break Tb 
Possible causes 
Ln (GDP95) 4 -0.01 -6.65 0.616 -4.61 Non-stationary 1995:02 Business cycle peaked in 1995; terms of trade deterioration; weakening yen; end 
of the equipment and infrastructure investment boom.  
Ln (GNI) 8 -0.018 -13.5 0.590 -4.31 Non-stationary 1994:03 Expansionary government policy; equipment and infrastructure boom. 
Ln (Pc) 8 -0.016 -8.81 0.861 -2.65 Non-stationary 1997:03 Asian financial crisis 
Ln (Gc) 8 -0.006 -3.74 0.687 -3.01 Non-stationary 1993:04 Stabilization policy designed to reduce inflationary pressure. 
Ln (GFCF) 8 -0.029 -14.4 0.717 -3.76 Non-stationary 1994:02 Equipment and infrastructure investment boom 
Ln (X) 8 -0.014 -8.32 0.736 -3.25 Non-stationary 1985:01 Reduced inflation; improved competitiveness and productivity 
Ln (IM) 7 -0.014 -6.43 0.809 -2.84 Non-stationary 1994:02 Expansionary government policy; domestic market opening to foreign 
competition; liberalization of foreign capital inflows;  construction and domestic 
infrastructure investment boom; rising private consumption; increased imports of 
capital goods (32.5 per cent), industrial materials (32.6 per cent) and consumer 
goods (27.8 per cent).  
Ln (CPI) 4 -0.004 -7.87 0.890 -4.01 Non-stationary 1996:01 Price stability became the government’s primary focus. Stable agricultural prices, 
increased competition from imports and subdued consumption spending 
contributed to low inflation particularly in the second half of 1996. The decline in 
inflation was also facilitated by excess capacity arising from the equipment and 
investment boom of 1994-95, and by a softening of global demand. 
Ln (Ms) 7  -0.018 -8.77 0.804 -3.12 Non-stationary 1997:01 The Hanbo debacle. On 23 January Korea’s second biggest steel company 
imploded under a US$5.9 billion debt, which took out its entire parent group the 
then fourteenth largest Korean conglomerate. The Bank of Korea swiftly injected 
6 trillion won (US$7 billion) in liquidity to prevent a possible chain reaction of 
bankruptcies.  
Ln (ER) 3  0.009 5.27 0.829 -2.64 Non-stationary 1991:01 Strong economic growth; rapid growth of imports; investment and consumer 
(industrial materials and consumer goods) boom; trade and current account 
blowout 
Note: critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are equal to -5.28, -4.65 and -4.38, respectively.  The additive outlier model (AO) allows for a break in the slope and, in 
this methodology, changes are assumed to occur rapidly. Tb is selected as the value, which minimizes the absolute value of the t-statistic on the parameter associated with 
change in slope in (AO) model, (K Max= 8). 
Source: Derived by the authors. 
 14











80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04















80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04














80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04















80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
















80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04















80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04






















80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04


































80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04

















80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04





Note: The time (Tb) of structural breaks based on: (a) the IO2 or IO1 model (impacting on both the 
intercept and the slope or Intercept only of each series) is shown by a solid line (b) the AO model 
(impacting on the slope only) is indicated by the dotted line. 
 
Source: Derived by the authors. 
 
by the authorities that included the tightening of monetary conditions. For Pc the 
structural break in quarter three of 1993 is likely to be a reflection of the success of 
the anti inflationary measures of 1990-91, which resulted in a sharp decline in 
investment, consumption spending and overall economic slowdown during 1992-93. 
This also contributed to declining wage push and further constrained private 
consumption spending. The structural break for X in the third quarter of 2000 can be 
linked to a sharp decline in economic growth in the US economy and globally, 
declining demand for Korea’s exports, particularly of IT products (reflected in 
declining semi-conductor sales) as well as a decline in semi-conductor prices. While, 
overall, export growth for the whole of 2000 was quite strong, by the second half of 
the year a deterioration was becoming apparent.   
 
From Table 3 the AO model shows that endogenously determined Tbs for the ten 
macro variables of interest are, noticeably, quite different from those specified using 
the IO models. For GDP95 the endogenous structural break is found to occur in the 
second quarter of 1995. This coincided with a peak in the business cycle at this time, 
and subsequent downturns in the semi-conductor, metals and petrochemical 
businesses and a deterioration in the terms of trade (from a decline, in particular, in 
the price of semi-conductors). Korea was hit by its worst terms of trade conditions 
since the oil shock of 1979 with a drop in export prices (semiconductor prices) 
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beginning in the second quarter of 1995, which had a profound effect on Korea’s 
macroeconomic performance. 
 
For GNI the endogenous structural break is found to occur in the third quarter of 
1994. This coincided with the implementation of an expansionary economic plan 
under the, then, new government led by Kim Young Sam; an equipment and 
infrastructure investment boom; the further opening up of domestic markets to foreign 
competition; the liberalization of foreign capital inflows; a strong export performance 
assisted by a high yen which gave Korean exporters a competitive advantage over 
Japanese exporters; a boom in construction and domestic infrastructure investment; 
and steadily rising private consumption. 
 
For Pc the endogenous structural break is found to occur in the third quarter of 1997. 
During this period of time the contagion effect from the Asian financial crisis was 
contributing to rapid declines in the value of regional currencies and in regional stock 
markets. This compounded already deteriorating macroeconomic conditions during 
the early part of 1997, including a deterioration of the already shaky position of the 
financial sector which, subsequently, became increasingly loan shy, and there was 
increased anticipation of a rise in the rate of inflation. Further chaebol bankruptcies 
throughout the year, including that of the Kia motor group in July 1997, as well as 
increasing concern over the country’s ability to service its short term debts, further 
compounded the uncertainty and proved to be a drag on private consumption 
spending. 
 
The endogenous structural break for Gc is found to have occurred in the fourth quarter 
of 1993. This can be potentially explained by the fact that GDP growth declined 
sharply in 1992 and 1993 primarily due to a significant slowdown in investment and 
consumption expenditure, as part of a stabilization policy that also included a sharp 
decline in government consumption expenditure to reduce inflationary pressure in the 
economy. By 1994 there was a modest recovery in government consumption 
expenditure. 
 
The endogenous structural break for GFCF is found to have occurred in the second 
quarter of 1994. This corresponds to the start of a boom in construction, equipment 
and domestic infrastructure investment which remained strong throughout the rest of 
1994 and peaked in early 1995. Thereafter, a prolonged period of steady decline, with 
some exceptions, in the annual growth of GFCF until the first quarter of 1998 is 
apparent.  
 
The endogenous structural break for X is found to have occurred in the first quarter of 
1985. The economic stabilization measures of the early 1980s, introduced by the 
authoritarian government of President Chun Doo Hwan, focusing upon economic 
stabilization and liberalization, began to produce results by the mid 1980s. Inflation 
decreased, the economy recovered its competitiveness, productivity and growth. 
Export growth began to take-off at this point such that by 1986 the nation experienced 
its first current account surplus in its modern history. 
 
The endogenous structural break for IM is found to have occurred in the second 
quarter of 1994. During the early 1990s the country sustained high export growth, 
however this rapid growth of exports occurred in conjunction with an equally rapid 
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growth of imports. Imports grew most noticeably over the period 1994-95, fuelled by 
increased imports of capital goods (32.5 per cent), industrial materials (32.6 per cent) 
and consumer goods (27.8 per cent). Substantial imports of machinery and equipment 
were apparent for the economy and seen as essential for the expansion and upgrading 
of productive capacity. The government’s expansionary economic policy, domestic 
market opening to foreign competition, liberalization of foreign capital inflows, the 
construction and investment boom and rising private consumption expenditure at this 
time all contributed to buoyant import demand. 
 
The endogenous structural break for CPI is found to have occurred in the first quarter 
of 1996. Consumer price inflation was generally on a downward trend during the 
period of the 1990s, from relatively high rates in 1990 and 1991, with the exception of 
1994. Price stability, however, became the government’s primary focus during 1996. 
Stable agricultural prices, increased competition from imports and subdued 
consumption spending contributed to low inflation particularly in the second half of 
1996. The decline in inflation was also facilitated by excess capacity arising from the 
equipment and investment boom of 1994-95 and by a softening of global demand in 
1996.  
 
In the case of Ms the endogenous structural break is found to occur in the first quarter 
of 1997. Macroeconomic conditions deteriorated in early 1997 arising from labour 
unrest due to the proposed introduction of new legislation making worker lay-offs 
easier, in conjunction with restrictions on union activities. In the same quarter, 23 
January 1997, the Hanbo debacle occurred. Korea’s second biggest steel company 
imploded under a US$5.9 billion debt, which took out its entire parent group the then 
fourteenth largest Korean conglomerate. The Bank of Korea swiftly injected 6 trillion 
won (US$7 billion) in liquidity to prevent a possible chain reaction of other corporate 
bankruptcies which would then have a deleterious effect on the financial sector. 
 
Finally, the variable ER is found to have an endogenous structural break in the first 
quarter of 1991. This is somewhat surprising, particularly given the traumatic 
developments in the financial sector and the exchange rate in the third and fourth 
quarters of 1997. However, during the early part of the 1990s the won did experience 
a continual depreciation against the US dollar. The strong growth of the economy in 
1990 and 1991, arising primarily from the boom in the construction sector, resulted in 
an overheating of the economy, rapid growth of private consumption and investment 
spending, rapid expansion of imports, industrial materials and consumer goods in 
particular, and inevitable trade and current account blow-outs. This contributed to the 
weakening of the currency from 716.4 won per US dollar in 1990 to 760.8 won per 
US dollar by 1991.  
 
While the results presented and discussed in this section show some interesting 
differences between Perron’s Innovational Outlier and Additive Outlier 
methodologies, which are the most advanced methodologies for the examination of 
structural breaks in non-stationary time series, it is important to note that these tests 
are unable to detect the presence of multiple structural breaks. Therefore, the 
possibility exists that other potentially significant breaks occurred during the period of 
analysis. Only the most significant of these are detected through Perron’s 
methodologies.   
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5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
The Korean economy has experienced intermittent periods of economic turbulence, 
with the likelihood of resulting structural breaks, during its prolonged period of 
economic growth and development since the early 1960s. The most recent and 
obvious of these being the effects arising from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the 
tech wreck of 2000-01 and the credit card bubble of 2001-02. The existence of such 
structural breaks means that tests for non-stationarity of Korean macroeconomic data, 
particularly using the conventional ADF test, may result in model misspecification 
and coefficient bias unless such breaks are robustly and correctly identified.  
 
Quarterly time series data for the Korean economy, covering the period 1980Q1-
2005Q1, was used to determine the most important years for the occurrence of 
structural breaks for key macroeconomic variables. In doing so the paper compared 
and contrasted tests for stationarity using the traditional ADF test procedure with that 
of the IO (which assumes a gradual change in the intercept and/or slope) and AO 
(which assumes instantaneous changes in intercept) model approaches, where the 
latter two both endogenously determine the timing of structural breaks. The empirical 
results presented showed that the conventional ADF unit root test and AO model 
provided no evidence against the null hypothesis of unit roots in any of the series 
under investigation. However, the IO model, which takes into account the gradual 
effects of potential structural breaks in the series, found that two of the variables 
examined are stationary. This finding is also consistent with empirical results 
derivable using the Zivot-Andrews procedure. This indicates that considerable care 
must be taken when conducting unit root tests on data that has a high likelihood of 
being subject to structural breaks, as in the case of macroeconomic data for Korea. 
 
While the IO and AO approaches used in this study are the most advanced methods to 
endogenously detect for significant structural breaks, they are unable to identify 
multiple structural breaks. As Ben-David and Papell (1997) note, tests that allow for 
multiple structural breaks, such as Bai and Perron (2003), are restricted to stationary 
and non-trending data which is not the case for the variables under investigation in 
this research. Although this paper has shed some light on the major structural breaks 
in Korean macroeconomic data, and possible explanations and factors behind these, 
future research should give more attention to the issue of multiple structural breaks, 
especially when dealing with long-term time series data. 
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